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INTRODUCTION
Some thirty years ago the national conscience was aroused by the destructive effect
of widespread unemployment on wages of workers. It was a time of depression.
Competition for limited markets forced employers to cut labor costs. Wages and
prices spiraled downward.
One bold way chosen to stop this trend was the National Industrial Recovery Act,'
providing for codes of fair competition for both prices and wages. Another, confined
to the construction industry, was the Davis-Bacon Act, passed in 1931 and strength-
ened in 1935,2 requiring the payment of prevailing wages to laborers and mechanics
performing contracts for the construction, alteration, and repair of public works of
the United States.
A third, and also limited effort, was the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act,
passed in I936,3 after the National Industrial Recovery Act had been declared un-
constitutional. This act became law at a time when regulation of labor standards
and the use of the commerce powers for this purpose were considered beyond the
reach of congressional action.4 It was clearly within the reach of Congress, however,
to prevent the purchasing power of the federal government from being used to
permit bidders on federal supply contracts to profit by depressing wages and working
conditions.
The Walsh-Healey Act established the eight-hour day and the forty-hour week,
prohibited child labor, set safety standards, and authorized the Secretary of Labor to
determine prevailing minimum wages for contract performance. It is, in a general
sense, a counterpart of the Davis-Bacon Act, setting labor standards for supply
contracts, as does the Davis-Bacon Act for construction contracts.
These basic statutes on labor standards for government contracts-the Walsh-
Healey Act and the Davis-Bacon Act-are the concern of this article: their usefulness,
their need, their operation, and their shortcomings. Each aspect of both statutes will
be separately examined.
*A.B. 1934, Princeton University; LL.B. 1937, Harvard University. Solicitor, U.S. Department of
Labor.
'Act of June i6, 1933, 48 Stat. 195.
246 Stat. 1494 (1931) as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276a (I958).
849 Stat. 2036 (1936) as amended, 4X U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1958).
'Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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COVERAGE PROVISIONS
A. Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act
The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act applies to all government contracts (i.e.,
those entered into by any executive department, independent establishment, or other
agency or instrumentality of the United States, the District of Columbia, or by any
corporation all the stock of which is beneficially owned by the United States) which
exceed $io,ooo, and which are for the manufacture or furnishing of materials,
supplies, articles, or equipment.
The description of agencies whose contracts are subject to the act is expansive,
but it has been interpreted not to include: (i) contracts by the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands; (2) contracts by the American Red Cross and
the Salvation Army; and (3) those of any state or political subdivision thereof or any
agency of a state or political subdivision, even though federal funds are used in
payment for materials, supplies, articles, or equipment.' The act has been held to
apply, however, to contracts of post exchanges and to contracts financed with non-
appropriated funds generally'
Concerning the application of the $io,ooo limitation, there has been some judicial
and an abundance of administrative precedent.8 Section three of the Department of
Labor Rulings and Interpretations No. 3 effectively describes the interpretations that
have been made. They may be summarized as follows: (I) contracts which are
indefinite in amount and which may exceed $io,ooo are considered subject to the act,
unless the contracting officer knows in advance that the total amount will not exceed
$io,ooo; (2) the act should be applied to a contract when its amount exceeds $io,ooo,
even though prompt payment may reduce the actual expenditure to a figure not
exceeding $io,ooo; (3) contracts calling for the delivery of material in installments
are considered subject to the act where the contract exceeds or may exceed $io,ooo;
(4) when an invitation for bids on several items totalling more than $ioooo permits
bidding on any one or more of the items not amounting to more than $ioooo,
awards made to different bidders for $ioooo or less are not subject to the act; (5)
if one contract is awarded containing several schedules for separate items and if the
total contract price exceeds $Io,ooo, the contract is subject to the act; (6) a contract
is not subject to the act when a person bids on several items of equipment of an
aggregate value exceeding $ioooo and he is low bidder on only a few items of an
r Sec. 1, 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 35 (i958). The act also applies to con-
struction, alteration, furnishing, or equipping of naval vessels, § 52, 52 Stat. 403 (1938), io U.S.C.
§7299 (1958).
0 U.S. Department of Labor Rulings and Interpretations No. 3 § 2.
7In re Park Sherman Co., Dep't of Labor Hearing Examiner's Dec. PC-4 "4 , Feb. 23, 1954 (1o WH
Cases 141); see also In re United Biscuit Co., Administrator's Dec. PC-77o, April 25, 1963; United Biscuit
Company v. Wirtz, 48 CCH Labor Cases 31,517 (D.D.C. 1963).
8 E.g., United States v. Ozmer, 9 WH Cases (5th Cir. I95O); George v. Mitchell, 282 F.2d 486, 496
(D.C. Cir. ig6o).
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aggregate value of $io,ooo or less; and (7) a contract is subject to the act if it is for
an amount exceeding $ioooo, even though the amount paid by the contractor for
freight charges reduces to a figure less than $Io,ooo the amount actually received by
him for the goods.
The act has been liberally applied to contracts "for the manufacture or furnishing
of materials, supplies, articles, and equipment." For example, the act has been held
to apply to contracts for "services" which consist of essentially manufacturing opera-
tions, such as furnishing labor to assemble tents supplied by the government,9 or
contracts for managing industrial plants.' ° It also has been held to apply to contracts
for sand, gravel, and rock." In the recent case of United States v. Stoc(s Lincoln-
Mercury,'2 the act was held to apply to a contract for furnishing both materials and
services. In the contract involved, the services were regarded as incidental or as an
integral part of the manufacture or furnishing of material, supplies, or equipment.
The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act has been interpreted not to apply to
contracts which are exclusively for personal services,"3 and those which are for the
rental of real estate or personal property' 4 There are exemptions in section nine of
the act for the following:
[P]urchases of such materials, supplies, articles, or equipment as may usually be bought in
the open market .. .perishables, including dairy, livestock and nursery products, or to
agricultural or farm products processed for first sale by the original producers ... contracts
made by the Secretary of Agriculture for the purchase of agricultural commodities or the
products thereof... carriage of freight or personnel by vessel, airplane, bus, truck, express,
or railway line where published tariff rates are in effect or to common carriers subject to
the Communications Act of 1934.15
These exemptions are narrowly construed. For example, the so-called "open
market" exemption has been held to apply only to purchases which the government
itself can make on the "open market."' 6 Some commentators contended that the
apparent intent of the exemption warrants a broader construction.' However, it is
readily apparent that the present construction is proper. A broader interpretation
would render meaningless some of the other statutory exemptions, such as those
for "perishable" and "agricultural" products.' Also, it would whittle away a sub-
stantial portion of the act's protection. This is an appropriate place to note that a
'In re Old Dominion Mfg. Co., Inc., Secretary of Labor's Dec. PC-157, April 1, 1946 (6 WH Cases
1223).
"I5n re Reynolds Research Corp., Dep't of Labor Hearing Examiner's Dec. PC-39, May 15, i95o (9
WH Cases 456), and cases cited therein.
"In re Ready-MLx Concrete Co., Dep't of Labor Hearing Examiner's Dec. PC-4oX, May li, 1951
(zo WH Cases 246), and cases cited therein. The act itself used the word "production" in section x(d).
12307 F.2d 266 (ioth Cir. 1963).
13 Walsh-Healey Public Contract Act, Rulings and Interpretations, No. 3, § 16.
"Id. § 17.
25 49 Stat. 2039 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 43 (1958).
"o Ruth Elkhorn Coals, Inc. v. Mitchell, 248 F.2d 635 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"Modley, Patton & Reilly, Problem Child Among Labor Laws-The Walsh-Healey Adt, DuXt
L.J. 205, 219 (Spring, 1963).
" Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, Rulings and Interpretations No. 3, §§ 9-18.
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question of the applicability of the "open market" exemption may properly be raised
in judicial review of prevailing minimum wage determinations 9
I do not propose to take up here all problems dealing with the application of the
Walsh-Healey Act, because the emphasis of this paper is upon the wage determina-
tion process. There are other problems, and I shall merely direct attention to some
of them. The act requires that every contractor be "a manufacturer of or a regular
dealer" in the material, supplies, articles, or equipment to be manufactured or used
in the performance of the contract. 0  This requirement was placed in the act in
order to do away with the undesirable effects of brokerage and bid peddling on labor
standards.2 1
One seeking familiarity with the act should also be aware of the so-called
"substitute manufacturer" question. "Substitute manufacturers" are subject to the
requirements of the act, whereas, "subcontractors" are not so subject. The general
rule is that an employer producing the materials, supplies, articles, or equipment or
performing the services that are required for the performance of a government con-
tract is considered a "substitute manufacturer" if it is the regular practice in the
industry engaged in the manufacture of the commodities called for by the govern-
ment contract for members of that industry to do such work themselves rather than
to have it done by others. On the other hand, if it is the regular practice in the
industry manufacturing the commodities called for by the contract for the manu-
facturer to purchase rather than to make particular components of the contract
commodities in question, the one who supplies such components to him is not
considered covered by the act. He is regarded as a "subcontractor."2  But if it is
not the regular practice in such industry for such performance to be carried out by
others, but rather that the prime contractor actually perform the work in question,
then anyone contracting with the prime contractor for such performance is con-
sidered a "substitute manufacturer," and is covered by the act.2 3
B. Davis-Bacon Act
The Davis-Bacon Act applies to:24
[E]very contract in excess of $2,ooo, to which the United States or the District of Columbia
is a party, for construction, alteration and/or repair, including painting and decorating,
of public buildings or public works of the United States or the District of Columbia ....
" Ruth Elkhorn Coals, Inc. v. Mitchell, supra note 16. Contra, Consolidated Electric Lamp Co.
v. Mitchell, 13 WH Cases 288 (D.D.C. 1957).
'"Sec. i(a), 49 Stat. (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1958). See the application of these terms in 41 C.F.R.
§ oI.aOI. (Rev. 1963.)
" H.R. REP. No. 2946, 7 4th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (936). See also Perkins v. Lukens Steel, 310 U.S. 113,
118 (1940).
"' Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, Rulings and Interpretations No. 3 § 30.
"Id. § 3.
"Sec. 1, 46 Stat. 1494 (93), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1958). The Davis-Bacon or prevailing
wage concept has also been applied in the indicated sections of the following laws: the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1956 [§ ioS(b), 70 Stat. 378 (1956), recodiied at 72 Stat. 895 (958), 23 U.S.C.
§ 113(a) (1958)]; National Housing Act [§ 212 added to c. 874, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934), by § 54, 53
Stat. 807 (939)), as amended §§ io(j), 2oi(b), 704(c), 73 Stat. 661, 667, 686 (1959); § 612(e), 75
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The term "contracts to which the United States . .. is a party" has been generally
interpreted as covering the contracts of agencies of the type listed in section one
of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act. Note the similarity between this section
and the definition of the term "federal agency" in Department of Labor Regula-
tions, Part 5.20 Consequently, section two of the Department of Labor Rulings and
Interpretations No. 3 interpreting the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act also serves
as a general guide to the application of the Davis-Bacon Act. For example, the
Davis-Bacon Act has been held not to apply to the contracts of any state or political
subdivision thereof or any agency of a state or political subdivision.
Also, as in the case of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, the Davis-Bacon
Act has been interpreted as applying to contracts of nonappropriated fund instru-
mentalities, such as Army and Air Force exchanges, officers' open messes, and
enlisted men's open messes.26
Because of textual differences between the two acts, however, the coverage
question with regard to nonappropriated funds is close with respect to the Davis-
Bacon Act. The Davis-Bacon Act expressly refers to contracts to which the United
States is a party, and there is a line of judicial decisions holding that there is no right
of action under the Court of Claims Act against the United States for a breach of
contract by a post exchange.2 7 Also, the recent Supreme Court case of Pard V.
United States"8 drew a distinction between contracts with appropriated funds and
those with nonappropriated funds in holding that state milk price controls would not
affect contracts made with appropriated funds because of conflict with federal pro-
curement regulations, but would affect those made with nonappropriated funds.
The Court expressly mentioned the inclusion of Davis-Bacon standards provisions in
contracts with appropriated funds in suggesting the possible effectuating of state
Stat. i8r (196i), 12 U.S.C. § 1715c (Supp. IV, 1962)]; the Housing Act of z959 [S 202, 73 Stat. 667
(959), 12 U.S.C. § 17oiq (Supp. IV, 1962)]; the College Housing Act of 195o [as added, § 602, 73 Stat.
681 (9.59), 12 U.S.C. § 1749a (Supp. IV, 1962)]; the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [S 5, 75
Stat. 2o6 (ig6i), 33 U.S.C. § 466e (Supp. IV, x962)]; the Hospital Survey and Construction Act [S 625
as added to c. 373 (1944), by § 2, 6o Stat. 1041 (940), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291h (1958)]; the
Federal Airport Act [ x5, 6o Stat. 178 (946), 49 U.S.C. § 1114 (1958)]; the Housing Act of 1949
[§ 1o9, 63 Stat. 419 (949), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1459 (1958)]; School Survey and Construction
Act of x95o [§ 1o1, 72 Stat. 551 (1958), 20 U.S.C. § 636 (1958) prior similar provisions at § 2o5, 64
Stat. 972 (1950)]; Defense Housing and Community Facilities and Services Act of 595! [5 31o, 65 Stat.
307 (195), 42 U.S.C. § 1592i (1958)], the United States Housing Act of 1937 [5 16, 50 Stat. 896
(1937), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 146 (1958)]; Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 [S 3(c), 72 Stat.
533 (1958), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2281 (1958)]; Area Redevelopment Act [§ 21, 75 Stat. 61 (1961), 42
U.S.C. § 2518 (Supp. IV, 1962)]; Delaware River Basin Compact, [9§5, 75 Stat. 714 (1961)]; Health
Professions Educational Assistance Act of x963 [§ 721, 77 Stat. 167 (1963)], and the Community Mental
Health Centers Act [§ 205, 77 Stat. 292 (z963)]; Higher Education Facilities Act of x963 [§ 403, 77
Star. 328 (1963); Vocational Education Act of 1963 [§ 7, 77 Stat. 408 (1963)].
2529 C.F.R. 512(j); 29 Fed. Reg. oo (1964). The regulations were promulgated under Re-
organization Plan No. 14 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3176 (95x), 63 Stat. 1267 (195), 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15
(1958).
2 Letter to the Department of the Army, dated March 23, 1955, from Assistant Solicitor.
"
7 See Bailey v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 6o5 (D. Alas. 1962); Pulaski Cab Company v. United
States, i57 F. Supp. 955 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Borden v. United States, x6 F. Supp. 873 (Ct. Cl. 1953); and
Edelstein v. South Post Officers' Club, 118 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Va. 1951).
28371 U.S. 245 (1963).
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milk pricing controls by similar means.29 But the Court was silent concerning the
application of such standards to contracts with nonappropriated funds.
On the other hand, there was no question concerning the application of labor
standards before the Court in the Paul decision. Also, there would seem to be no
question about the fact that nonappropriated funds agencies are instrumentalities of
the United States.3 ° Their activities are either established and created through the
use of appropriated funds, or are maintained from profits indirectly derived from
the use of appropriated moneys. 1 The United States is liable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act for the negligence of employees of nonappropriated funds in-
strumentalities.32  Their employees are federal employees, even though by express
congressional direction they are not considered employees of the United States for the
purpose of any laws administered by the Civil Service Commission or the provisions
of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act0 3 But more importantly, construction
by nonappropriated funds instrumentalities is covered by the Miller Act,34 the
federal construction bond statute. This has particular significance because the Miller
Act is virtually co-extensive with the Davis-Bacon Act in its application,35 and was
enacted by the same Congress.36 Further, it seems obvious that the Contract Work
Hours Standards Act3 ' would apply to construction by nonappropriated funds in-
strumentalities, because it applies to, among other things, contracts involving the
employment of laborers and mechanics on federal public works.
The starting point in considering the application of the Davis-Bacon Act to
"mixed" contracts is section 6(b) of the Department of Labor's publication, Walsh-
2 Id. at 255.
"'Standard Oil Company of California v. Johnson, 36 U.S. 481 (942), holding that non-
appropriated funds are protected from state taxing powers. See also the decision of the Comptroller
General at 38 DEcs. CoMp. GE. 470 (1959) holding that sales to a ship's store or similar organizations
were sales to an agency of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy within the
meaning of statutes restricting the selling activities of retired officers [§ 13o9, 67 Stat. 437 (1953), 5
U.S.C. § 59C (1958), c. 1041, 7oA Stat. 383 (1956), io U.S.C. § 6112(b) (1958)].
5I38 DEcs. CoMp. GEN. 470, 475 (i959)-
a United States v. Holcombe, 272 F.2d 143 (4 th Cir. 396o).5 2Ibid. See also, § i, 66 Stat. 338 (1952), 5 U.S.C. § isoh (1958).
°"United States v. Phoenix Assurance Company of New York, 363 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Cal. i958).
This was a suit brought under the Miller Act for supplying labor and materials for the construction of a
post library, with the cost of construction being paid by and from a non-appropriated fund. Standard
government contract forms were used, but the name of the particular fund was inserted in lieu of that
of the United States. The court held that the Miller Act applied, concluding that the post library
was a public building or public work of the United States. In so doing, the court observed that it was
not necessary to find a formal contract with the United States. The court stated (at p. 715) that: "the
test is not whether there was a formal contract in the name of the United States, but whether there was a
contract 'for the construction . . . of any public building or public work of the United States.' If the
person or agency making the contract for the public building or public work, on behalf of the United
States had the authority to so contract, it is immaterial whether the contract is made in the name of
the United States or such person or agency." (Emphasis added.)
"The Miller Act applies to: "any contract, exceeding $2,ooo in amount, for the construction, altera-
tion, or repair of any public building or public work of the United States .. " Sec. 1, 49 Stat. 793
(1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270a (1958). The absence of the words "contract to which the United States ...
is a party" should be noted.
e 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1935).17 Sees. zox-io6, 76 Stat. 357-359 (I962), 40 U.S.C. H§ 327-332 (Supp. IV, 1963).
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Healey Public Contracts Act, Rulings and Interpretations, No. 3. Section 6(b) reads
as follows:
Contracts ... for the manufacture or furnishing of articles of equipment ... are subject
to the Public Contracts Act even though such contracts call for the erection or installation
of the articles or equipment after delivery. If such a contract involves more than an
incidental amount of erection or installation work it may be subject to the Davis-Bacon
Act with respect to such work if the site of the work is known at the time the invitation
to bid is issued. Examples of such contracts are those for manufacture or furnishing
and installation of elevators or generators requiring prepared foundations or housing.
(Emphasis added.)
The section assumes necessarily that such installation work would have to be
"construction, alteration, and/or repair" under the Davis-Bacon Act in order to be
covered thereby. Contracts which entail "more than an incidental amount of" such
activity, that is to say a substantial amount, are covered by the act. Recent applica-
tions of this test indicate that it has both quantitative and qualitative aspects. A
quantitative application based solely upon the act's $2,ooo monetary requirement has
been rejected." This seems sound. It is clear from the act and its legislative history
that the cost of construction must at least exceed $2,ooo in order to be covered
thereby. But it is by no means clear that all construction is covered which exceeds
$2,ooo in cost when it is combined with other types of work.
What is a "substantial" amount of construction has to be gleaned necessarily
from all the facts and circumstances. Both quantitative and qualitative considerations
are involved. In the case of common types of construction activity, quantitative
considerations appear to merit greater weight. For example, in a recent letter, it
was assumed that construction under a "mixed" contract, consisting mainly of trench-
ing, backfilling, and building manholes, and amounting to thirteen per cent of the
total contract cost, was covered by the Davis-Bacon ActO9 On the other hand, the
" In a memorandum of law attached to a letter from the Acting Solicitor of Labor to Leonard S.
Janofsky, February ii, Ig6o, regarding work at Vandenberg Air Force Base, the following was stated:
"It is our conclusion that installation work constituting construction activity is of a substantial
rather than incidental nature where it exceeds the jurisdictional requirements of the Davis-Bacon
Act [i.e., $2,000] in dollar value."
A letter from the Acting Solicitor of Labor to Headquarters, United States Air Force, March 17, 1960,
concerning work performed by the Hawaiian Telephone Company is to the same effect.
However, recent letters reject this purely quantitative approach.
In a letter to the Bureau of Ships, November 6, x961 (DB-x3 ), I stated the following:
"... [T]he $2,ooo monetary requirement of the Davis-Bacon Act is not regarded as the only test
of coverage in the case of supply and installation contracts. In the case of the instant contracts, how-
ever, the cost of the construction activity not only exceeded the monetary standard of the Davis-Bacon
Act, but, in fact, constituted the major cost of the contract, as shown by the breakdown of estimated
labor and material cost which you submitted."
To the same effect are letters of the Solicitor to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Logistics, November 30, ig6i, concerning work at Camp Roberts, California, and to the Directorate of
Procurement Management, Dep't of the Air Force, April 16, 1962, regarding work at Malstrom Air
,Force Base, Montana (DB-2 3 ).
" Letter of Solicitor to the Directorate of Procurement Policy, Dep't of the Air Force, dated July 9,
1963, concerning work at Vandenburg Air Force Base, Calif. (DB-3 7). The Comptroller General has
also employed a test of substantiality. Cf. 40 Dacs. ComP. GEN. 565 (i961). On the same facts con-
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act has not been applied to installation operations which are simple in character,
involving no structural or engineering operations and taking individually a minimum
of time and which are categorized as incidental to manufacturing and furnishing
articles.40 Such operations are not substantial in a "mixed contract" setting, even
if it is assumed that they constitute "construction."
The testimony before the Roosevelt Subcommittee in connection with its investi-
gation of the administration of the Davis-Bacon Act and proposed fringe benefits
amendments has demonstrated the extreme difficulty of prescribing general interpre-
tative rules concerning the term "construction."41  The report of the Missile Site
Public Contracts Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Labor (the so-called
"Holland Report") well illustrates this 42  Contractor associations and trade unions
were vehement in their hostility to the report, whereas manufacturer groups and
industrial unions endorsed it.43
The definitions contained in the Department's Regulations, Part'5,44 appear ade-
quate to cope at least with conventional problems.45 Section 5.2(g) defines "con-
struction" as "all types of work done on a particular building or work at the site
thereof." Section 5 .2(f) defines the term "work" as including "construction activity
as distinguished from manufacturing, furnishing of materials, or servicing and
maintenance work," and enumerates common examples of such activity. Other
problems are dealt with pragmatically. For example, in the case of contracts of the
Atomic Energy Commission, a number of guides have been developed for solving
particular coverage problems of that agency.4 6 Many questions are referred to us
sidered in the Solicitor's letter of July 9, 1963, the Comptroller General expressed the opinion that I3%
of the work under a contract is not a substantial part, and therefore, the Davis-Bacon Act would not
apply. See Comptroller General's Letter B-1 5o3i8, dated June 6, 1963. See also Cox, The Davis-Bacon
A4ct and Defense Construction, in NEw Yonx UNIVRSITY, 15TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 151,
173 (1962).
"'Letter of Solicitor to Directorate of Procurement Management, Dep't of the Air Force, April i6,
1962, regarding work at Malstrom Air Force Base, Montana (DB-3 7 ).
"Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and
Labor on H.R. 9656 and 9657, the Administration of the Davis-Bacon Act, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
" The Committee recommended the following:
"A. Work performed at missile sites shall be construed to be 'construction, alteration, and/or repair,
including painting and decorating' within the meaning of this act only if such work is performed for or
is incidental to the purpose of
I. providing housing, shelter, protection access to, or permanent foundation for a missile or space
vehicle, its associated and supported systems (including components thereof), and for site personnel,
or
2. providing such basic services and facilities (e.g., primary power, heat, illumination, plumbing,
air conditioning, etc.) as are necessary to fully equip and fit out a building or structure (surface
or subsurface) in order to meet the requirements for which such building or structure is designed.
"B. Work performed at missile sites shall not be construed as 'construction, alteration and/or repair,
including painting and decorating' within the meaning of the act if such work is performed for or is
incidental to the purpose of providing a fully operable missile or space vehicle, together with its
associated and supporting systems (including components thereof)." 2oo BNA DAILY LABOR REP. E-i
(i961).
'a 51 BNA DAILY LABOR REP. A-7-IO (i962).
"29 C.F.R. Part 5; 29 Fed. Reg. 99 (1964).
"See Cox, supra note 39.
"4i C.F.R. §§ 9-12.5000, 9-12.5005-2 (Rev. z963).
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under section 5.12 of Regulations, Part 5, which provides that: "All questions
arising in any agency relating to the application and interpretation... of the Davis-
Bacon Act ... shall be referred to the Secretary of Labor for appropriate ruling orinterpretation."'
The word "works" in the term "public works" generally refers to improvements,
such as buildings, roads, canals, rather than to progress or activity. For example, the
isolated act of drilling or digging would not be within the term because it is an
activity as distinguished from an improvement. 8 As a general rule, the work is
"public" and federal when it is a work in which the United States is interested,
regardless of whether title therein is in the federal government, and which is
carried out with federal funds to serve the interest of the general public. 9 The
exclusive expenditure of federal funds is a good rule of thumb for ascertaining
whether a federal public work is involved. But it cannot be categorically applied
because the words of the statute have their commonly accepted meaning. Recently,
we had an instance where state highway facilities were being relocated under a
state construction contract in connection with a Corps of Engineers project for
river channel improvement. The work was carried out exclusively with federal
funds, but all the facts and circumstances indicated that the project could only be
fairly characterized as a non-federal public work, 0 simply because the only federal
aspect of the work was the use of federal funds.
The prevailing wage protection of the act is provided to "laborers" and "me-
chanics" who are employed by the contractor and any of his "subcontractors" and
who are "employed directly upon the site of the [contract] work."'" Whether par-
ticular workers are "laborers" or "mechanics" presents largely a question of fact.
The general rule is that a "laborer" is one who performs manual work at a toilsome
occupation requiring physical strength as distinguished from mental training,
whereas a "mechanic" is a skilled workman who has learned a trade. 2 A "sub-
contractor" is generally one who undertakes the performance of a specific part of the
government construction contract, except where the undertaking is that of an ordinary
materialman or manufacturer.63 Employment "directly upon the site of the
[contract] work" usually means the physical location of the public building or work
involved. But the phrase may also include the location of contract work which is
functionally and proximately connected with contract performance. Work has been
regarded as functionally and proximately connected with contract performance when
it is carried out at a temporary facility established almost exclusively to meet the
47 29 C.F.R. § 5.12; 29 Fed. Reg. 103 (1964).
"s Letter from Solicitor to Deputy General Counsel, Corps of Engineers, dated June 25, x963, relating
to exploratory drilling.
" See 29 C.F.R. § 5 .2(h); 29 Fed. Reg. ioo (1964). Cf. United States to the Use of Noland v. Irwin,
36 U.S. 23 (1942), and Peterson v. United States, 119 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 194).
o Letter from Solicitor to Deputy General Counsel, Corps of Engineers, dated June 21, 1963.
' Supra note 24.
5' Hearings, supra note 4, at 823.
3Id. at 830.
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needs of the contract rather than to serve the public; such facility is located within
the general area of construction; and the facility is integrated with construction
needs. 4
II
WAGE DETmMNATIONS
A. Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act
i. The Determinations procedure.
All wage determinations under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act must be
on the record after an opportunity for a hearing.55 Such determinations are subject
to the requirements of sections seven and eight of the Administrative Procedure
Act.5 6 The rules of practice governing minimum wage determination proceedings57
comply with those requirements.
The Rules of Practice provide that "proceedings may be initiated by the Secretary
[of Labor] upon his own motion or upon the request of any party showing a proper
interest in the industry." 8 After such initiation, the first step in the wage deter-
mination process is usually the holding of an industry panel meeting.59 Attending
the panel meeting are generally representatives of the Wage and Hour and Public
Contracts Division, which has the responsibility of administering the statute,60
counsel from the Office of the Solicitor, representatives of various trade associations
interested in the industry, and representatives of the AFL-CIO and the labor unions
which are prominent in the industry.
Several important matters are taken up at the panel meeting. The definition of
the industry which will be the subject of the wage determination, and any branches
which should be considered for wage determination purposes, is considered. The
other matters generally relate to a wage survey which is conducted by the Department
for each proceeding. In recent years, the survey has been conducted by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS).' There is discussion of such things as the form of the
" In the phrase "employed directly upon the site of the work," the word "work" does not appear
to refer to the public building or public work which is the subject of construction, alteration, or repair.
This would require the word to refer back to words "public buildings or public works." If Congress
intended such a reference it is reasonable to infer that it would have made it. A similar phrase in section
2 of the act is followed by the phrase "covered by the contract." It seems then that the latter phrase fills
an ellipsis following the word "work" in the limitation in question. As to the word "directly," the
legislative history of the limitation indicates only a congressional intent not to cover work which is
only indirectly or remotely connected with contract performance, such as mill work on materials which
are to be used in federal construction. Cf. Comptroller General's letter B-148o76, July 26, 1963.
o Sec. Io, c. 881 (1936), as added § 301, 66 Stat. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C. § 43a (1958).
o Secs. 7, 8, 6o Stat. 241, 242 (946), 5 U.S.C. §§ ioo6, 1007 (1958).
547 C.F.R. § 50-203.15-50-203.22 (Rev. 1963).
so 41 C.F.R. § 50-203.15 (Rev. 1963). Provisions of the act requiring the inclusion of representations
with respect to minimum wages apply only to contracts which have been the subject of a determination by
the Secretary, § 12, formerly § I1, 49 Stat. 2039 (1936), renumbered § 3o, 66 Stat. 308 (1952), 4
U.S.C. § 45 (x95 8).
ro 41 C.F.R. § 50-203.16 (Rev. 1963).
00 U.S. Gov. ORG. MANUAL 324 (x963).
" See Tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 26 Fed. Reg. 5898 (i961) (manifold business forms industry).
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wage questionnaire to be used in the making of a survey of the industry, the payroll
period for this survey, the size of establishments to be surveyed, and lists of establish-
ments to be included in the survey. The present use of the industry panel has its
critics. 2 On the whole, however, it has met with substantial approval.
Upon completion of the BLS survey, which is discussed at the panel meeting, the
Department is ready to commence the formal proceedings. It is begun by publica-
tion of a notice of hearing in the Federal Register.63 Generally, the notice is pub-
lished at least thirty days before the hearings.64 The notice contains a tentative
definition of the industry, sets forth the subjects and issues of the hearing such as the
adequacy of the definition, whether there should be branch or regional determina-
tions, the prevailing minimum wages in the industry or branches thereof, in some
instances whether there should be a separate provision for beginners, and the date of
effectiveness of any wage determination. 5  Interested persons are informed in the
notice that they may obtain upon request the tabulated wage and employment data
of the BLS survey. By means of this offer, those attending the hearing have an
opportunity to acquaint themselves with the data in advance of any presentation
they may wish to make. Neither the Department's rules nor the terms of the notice
require that the interested persons file any prehearing statements indicating the
general nature of their presentations. It is important to note that the notice sets
forth subjects and issues for the hearing. It sets forth no proposed rules, because
the Department is not a proponent of any given minimum wage as being that which
should be determined to be the prevailing minimum Wage in the industry, or any
branch thereof.
The hearing is presided over by a hearing examiner appointed under section
eleven of the Administrative Procedure Act." The hearing examiner rules upon the
admissibility of evidence, rules upon procedural requests, and otherwise regulates the
course of the proceeding.6"
The Department of Labor usually proceeds first at.the hearing presenting evidence
helpful to a prevailing minimum wage determination. An economist from the
BLS testifies concerning the conduct and compilation of the wage survey, which
is offered in evidence. Upon cross-examination he is often questioned about the
quality of any sampling and the accuracy of what the tabulations purport to show.
The witness is sometimes asked upon cross-examination to disclose data underlying
the survey, and related requests for compulsory process in order to obtain such data
are often made. However, the replies to the BLS survey questionnaire are obtained
02 Modley, Patton & Reilly, supra note 17, at 222. Note the discussion of the recommendations of
the Advisory Council Committee Report which would substantially formalize the meeting.
:341 C.F.R. § 50-202I7(b). A press release is also issued.
'
4 This has been found to be sufficient notice. E.g., Tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 20 Fed. Reg. 5690
(1955) (bituminous coal industry).
'"E.g., 28 Fed. Reg. 3784 (5963) (notice of hearing: construction machinery and equipment in-
dustry); 27 Fed. Reg. 9656 (I962) (battery industry).
" 6o Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § IOIO (I958).
OT41 C.F.R. §§ 5o-2o3.i8, .i9, and .20 (Rev. z963).
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under a pledge of confidence, and are seen only by sworn employees of the Bureau.
No information from the respondent is released by the BLS. In the past, the Secre-
tary has consistently held that, on balance, the need for this information for cross-
examination purposes is outweighed by the burden which it would place upon the
government. s
Typically, the BLS witness is cross-examined rigorously concerning the prepara-
tion of the tabulations, the techniques employed in their preparation, and the possi-
bilities of upward or downward bias because of these techniques. It is not unusual
to find a close correspondence between the critical statistics shown on the bureau
survey and those on surveys conducted by participating trade associations.6" Under
these circumstances, particularly when the subject matter and evidence in rule-
making proceedings are broadly economic or statistical in character and the parties
are numerous, extensive cross-examination rarely contributes substantially to the
record, and is often not necessary for a full and true disclosure of the facts7 Also,
the production of the voluntary responses to the Bureau survey would breach a
pledge of confidence given to obtain the information. This breach could jeopardize
the effectiveness of the work of the Bureau, not only with respect to wage surveys for
the Walsh-Healey program, but also its other important programs, such as its pro-
duction of monthly figures on employment, hours, and earnings of workers in the
non-agricultural economy.
An economist from the Wage and Hour and Public Contract Divisions usually
testifies at the hearing concerning information relating to the competition for govern-
ment contracts in the industry establishments located in various geographic regions
throughout the country. The testimony runs to the issue of whether regional deter-
minations should be made for the industry. The purpose is only to present evidence
with respect to this issue. As indicated earlier, the Department sets forth no pro-
posed rules in the notice of hearing, and it does not seek to support any position when
it puts into evidence data relating to the competition for government contracts.
At this point, the hearing examiner seeks to ascertain the preference of those par-
ticipating as to the order of presentations. Commonly, the trade associations make
their presentations following that of the Department. The presentations of organized
labor then follow.
Following the hearing and the expiration of the time for filling proposed findings
and conclusions, with accompanying briefs,71 the hearing examiner certifies the
o See tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 22 Fed. Reg. 3729 (1957) (scientific, industrial, and laboratory
instruments industry); final Labor Dep't Dec., 23 Fed. Reg. 1986 (1958) (scientific, industrial, and
laboratory instruments industry); tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 24 Fed. Reg. 8741 (1959) (tires and
related products industry); tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 27 Fed. Reg. 1913 (1962) (motors and
generators industry); tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 27 Fed. Reg. 11282 (1962) (electronic equipment
industry). But see Wirtz v. Baldor Electric Co., 48 CCH L.C. 31,518 (D.C. Cir. 1963), which discusses
this problem.
"
5 E.g., tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 27 Fed. Reg. 11282 (1962) (electronic equipment industry).
"o Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), p. 78, and legislative
history cited therein.
71 Sec. 8, 6o Stat. 242 (1948), 5 U.S.C. § 1007 (1958).
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record to the Secretary of Labor for his consideration. The hearing examiner issues
no decision, and makes no recommendations to the Secretary of Labor. The next
step is the issuance of a tentative decision by the Secretary, as provided in the rules
of practice' and in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act 7  The
tentative decisions are fully reasoned, and reflect a careful study of the proposed
findings and conclusions presented by interested persons. Following the tentative
decision, interested persons may file exceptions thereto. The Secretary then issues
a final decision after consideration of any exceptions, and discusses fully any matters
which are not subsumed in the narrative of the tentative decision.
In addition to the evidence relating to the proposed rule-making, the evi-
dence is received at the hearing in relation to the discretionary exception provided
in section 4(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act74 and reflected in the rules of
practice75 for shortening the delay in effective date of final decisions resulting in
wage determinations. In recent decisions, good cause has been found to shorten the
delay in effective date to seven daysY0 Generally, objection to diminution of the
delay in effective date is based on an allegation of inadequate time to adjust
to any new wage determination. However, because minimum wages prescribed
under the act apply only to contracts for which bids are solicited or negotiations
otherwise commenced on or after the effective date of a particular determination,77
and there are intervals of time between invitation for bids and their opening"8 the
time allowed for adjusting to any new determination seems likely in most cases
to equal or exceed thirty days when seven days is prescribed. Thus, it would seem
that further delay in most cases would not be in the public interest.
2. Application of statutory terms.
(a) Types of determination. Under section i(b) of the Walsh-Healey Public
Contracts Act,7 the Secretary of Labor determines "the prevailing minimum wages
for persons employed on similar work or in the particular or similar industries or
groups of industries currently operating in the locality in which the materials,
supplies, articles, or equipment are to be manufactured or furnished under the con-
tracts." The text has been interpreted as permitting the Secretary of Labor to deter-
mine prevailing minimum wages in accordance with three distinct standards,
namely, the prevailing minimum wages for persons employed: (i) on "similar
work," (2) in the "particular or similar industries," or (3) in "groups of industries
1 41 C.F.R. § 50-203.21 (Rev. 1963).
"'Sec. 8, 6o Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007 (958).
" 6o Stat. 238 (946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(C) (1958).
is41 C.F.R. § 50-203.22 (Rev. 1963).
"eE.g., final Labor Dep't Dec., 26 Fed. Reg. 2698 (596i) (manifold business forms industry), final
Labor Dep't Dec., 26 Fed. 7699 (196i) (paper and pulp industry), tentative Labor Dep't Dec,,
27 Fed. Reg. 11282 (1962) (electronic equipment industry), tentative Labor Dcp't Dec., 28 Fed. Reg.
6989 (x963) (engines and turbines industry).
*4x C.F.R. § 50-202.1 (Rev. x963).
18 See tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 27 Fed. Reg. 11282 (x962) (electronic equipment industry).
79 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), 5 U.S.C. § 35 (1958).
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currently operating in the locality" in which the contract is to be performed."0 In
the vast majority of cases, the Secretary has made determinations for "particular"
industries. None of the terms involved are defined in the act.
(b) "Prevailing minimum wages ... for persons employed." Concerning the
meaning of the term "wages," it should be noted that no determination decision
under the act has included payments for welfare and pension plans or any other
fringe benefits. 8' Although one decision left open the question of the relevance
of fringe benefits,82 other decisions have indicated that such benefits are not within
the term "wages."83  The AFL-CIO Economic Policy Committee has urged the
inclusion of fringe benefits in wage determinations under the act.84
With regard to the term "minimum wages," trade associations often urge the
Secretary to use in his determination the lowest established rates of various establish-
ments instead of the lowest wage rates actually paid during a representative payroll
period, contending that such lowest established rates are a better measure of the
minimum wages. The Secretary has consistently rejected this contention 5  The
lowest wage rates actually paid seem more representative of the particular industry
at any one time,88 and seem to serve more adequately the "persons employed"
standard of the act.8 7 Also, at least in some cases, lowest established wage rates
have not been shown to have been paid with sufficient recency to give reasonable
assurance that they will be used with respect to future employment88
In applying the term "prevailing," the Secretary seeks first to find out whether
there is a predominant minimum wage, and in the event there is none, he next seeks
the most representative minimum wage. 9 Typically, it is necessary to ascertain
the most representative minimum wage, because in most industries there is no
minimum wage which may be regarded as "prevailing" in the usual sense of the
term. 0 This brings us to consideration of the median method of arriving at the
most representative minimum wage, a method which has been the subject of some
so E.g., tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 17 Fed. Reg. 11197 (1952) (textile industry); tentative Labor Dep't
Dec., 2o Fed. Reg. 569o (1955) (bituminous coal industry).
8 Tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 17 Fed. Reg. X1197 (1952) (textile industry). See also tentative
Labor Dep't Dec., 27 Fed. Reg. 898 (1962) (machine tools industry).
"
2 Tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 23 Fed. Reg. 5129 (1958) (flour and related products industry).
"
5 Tentative Labor Dep't Dec., i9 Fed. Reg. 535 (1954) (woolen and worsted industry) and tentative
Labor Dep't Dec., 27 Fed. Reg. 898 (1962) (machine tools industry).
", See statement of Walter P. Reuther before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. 33 BNA
DAILY L A. REP,. A-9 (1963).
"
5 Tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 26 Fed. Reg. 10518 (1961) (office, computing, and accounting
machines industry).
"
6 In tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 25 Fed. Reg. 7801 (i96o) (electron tubes and related products
industry) it was noted that the lowest established rates table would present minimum wages at a level
lower than those which would be paid in the industry at any one time.
"'Tentatve Labor Dep't Dec., 25 Fed. Reg. 12363 (i96o) (metal business furniture and storage
equipment industry).
" Tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 25 Fed. Reg. 78oi (i96o) (electron tubes and related products
industry).
"' E.g., Tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 26 Fed. Reg. 4173 (1961) (electronic component parts industry),
Tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 27 Fed. Reg. 315 (x962) (drugs and medicine industry).t0 Modley, Patton & Reilly, supra note 17, at 218.
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comment. 1  With some variations because of facts and circumstances peculiar to
particular industries, the most representative minimum wage is found to be that
paid by about one-half of the establishments employing approximately one-half of
the employees covered by the act in a frequency distribution table containing the
lowest wage rates actually paid in such estal~lishments. 2
Trade associations have advanced from time to time proposed alternatives to
the median method. Perhaps the most significant of these is the so-called "inter-
quartile" method. Under the "interquartile" method, the dispersions from the median
are measured in both directions, both upward and downward, to the upper and
lower quartiles. The lowest point in the range, that is the lower quartile, would
be the point of determination 3 Thus, the method permits the ascertainment of a
prevailing range of minimum wages, but would ultimately prescribe a minimum
wage at the lower quartile, which would seem less representative of the lowest wages
actually paid than the median. The "interquartile" method has been carefully
considered in a number of proceedings, and it has been consistently rejected.04
Other methods have also been suggested, 5 but time does not permit their examina-
tion here.
(c) Locality. From the first wage determination under the act to the present, the
Secretary of Labor has prescribed industry-wide application of wage determinations
whenever the industry as a whole was found to constitute one competitive area for
the manufacturing or furnishing of the products of an industry under the government
contracts. 6  Industry-wide application of wage determinations has been validated
upon judicial review.97  In Mitchell v. Covington Mills,"8 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia stated concerning an industry-wide wage determination
for the textile industry:"
... [U]nlike some industries, only an industry-wide minimum will serve this purpose (i.e.,
to outlaw low wages as an element in the competition for Government contracts and to
use the leverage of the Government's purchasing power to raise labor standards), because
the competition is industry-wide. The District Court's construction of the Act would
make it necessary for the Secretary to fix separate minima according to the wages that
"
1 d. at ax. See also Backman & Levine, The Prevailing Minimum Wage Under the Walsh-Healey
,Act, NEw YoRK UNIVERSITY, I4 th ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 393, 417-19 (1961).
:2E.g., tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 23 Fed. Reg. 5334 (958) (soaps and related products industry).
'
5Tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 25 Fed. Reg. 12363 (Ig6o) (metal business furniture and storage
equipment industry).
'E.g., ibid.; also, tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 26 Fed. Reg. 7352 (196I) (miscellaneous chemical
products and preparations industry).
95 See, for example, tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 25 Fed. Reg. 9903 (196o) (paper and paperboard
containers and packaging products industry). Tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 26 Fed. Reg. 5626 (1961)
(paper and pulp industry).
00 Labor Dep't Dec., 2 Fed. Reg. 233 (I937) (men's clothing industry), tentative Labor Dep't Dec.,
28 Fed. Reg. 9318 (1963) (battery industry).
"Mitchell v. Covington Mills, 229 F.2d 5o6 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1002 (1956);
Consolidated Electric Lamp Company v. Mitchell, 259 F.ad 189 (D.C. Cir. i958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 908 (1959).
9 8Supra note 97.
ga229 F.2d at 508.
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prevail in each separate textile community. This would freeze the competitive advantage
of concerns that operate in low-wage communities and would in effect offer a reward
for moving into such communities. Obviously this would defeat the purpose of the Act.
However, it is unclear from Covington Mills or the subsequent decision in Consoli-
dated Electric Lamp Co.'00 whether the validity of industry-wide determinations
rests upon an interpretation that the locality standard of the act applies to wage
determinations for groups of industries, or simply on a broad construction of the
term "locality" in the light of the legislative purposes involved.
The foregoing should not be read as suggesting that geographic differentials in
minimum wages are not prescribed. They are, 1 ' and the issue of whether or not
such differentials should be made is present in every proceeding.
(d) Particular or similar industries, similar work, groups of industries. With
few exceptions, wage deteminations under the act are for "particular or similar
industries." The term "industries" or its singular form is not defined or restricted
by the act. Nor is it a term of precise content in general usage. The definitions of
particular industries are often drawn from industry groupings in the Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) Manual.' These groupings conform with the
structure of American industry, and have been found to furnish authoritative
guides.' However, it has been noted in wage determinations that there is sub-
stantial flexibility as to industrial scope authorized under the act. The act has been
held to authorize determinations applicable to branches of an industry,' or so-called
product divisions.
While it has been recently held that the "similar work" standard may not be used
to prescribe minimum wages for various industrial occupations, °5 this decision is
pending on appeal, with the Secretary of Labor contending it is in error. In an
early determination under the act for the men's hat and cap industry,' the Secretary
of Labor had declined a request for separate occupational minimum wages. This
position was later abandoned when the determination was amended to provide two
minimum wage rates; one for employees whose tasks were "subservient and supple-
mentary to the basic productive processes of the industry" and the other for the
remaining minimum wage workers. 1 7 Separate occupational minimum wages have
ooSupra note 97.
...E.g., Labor Dep't Dec., 4 Fed. Reg. 265 (1939) (iron and steel industry), tentative Labor
Dep't Dec., 2o Fed. Reg. 5690 (1955) (bituminous coal industry).
" Bureau of the Budget, Standard Industrial Classification Manual 0957).
" Tentative Labor Dep't Dec., I9 Fed. Reg. 535 ('954) (woolen and worsted industry).
10" Tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 24 Fed. Reg. 8741 (r959) (tires and related products industry) and
authority cited therein. For some illustrative determinations involving product divisions of branches,
see tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 21 Fed. Reg. 6142 (1956) (battery industry), tentative and final Labor
Dep't Decs., 25 Fed. Reg. 9903 (196o), 26 Fed. Reg. 7 (ig6i) (paper and paperboard containers and
packaging products industry), tentative Labor Dep't Dec., 28 Fed. Reg. 6989 (1963) (engines and turbines
industry).
" See Barber-Coleman Co. v. Wirtz, 6 WH Cases 267 (D.D.C. 1963).
... Labor Dep't Dec., 2 Fed. Reg. 1335 (i937). -
2073 Fed. Reg. 224 (1937), 13 Fed. Reg. 6o8i (948).
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been established by tolerances under section six of the act 08 more often than they
have been under the "similar work" standard.
The "groups of industries" standard has been used to establish under the act a
minimum wage for all industries which is equal to that payable under section 6(a) (x)
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, except in those particular or similar industries for
which higher minimum wages have been prescribed.'
B. Davis-Bacon Act
i. Wage determination process.
Contracts subject to the Davis-Bacon Act must contain a wage determination
made by the Secretary of Labor. There is no provision in the act comparable to
section twelve of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act,"10 permitting the making
of construction contracts without wage standard requirements in the absence of wage
determinations by the Secretary of Labor. In most cases, separate wage determina-
tions are made for individual contracts."" In the remainder of cases, wage determina-
tions of more general application are made for the contracts of an agency in a
particular area where the volume of construction is high; wage patterns are well
established; and the evidence indicates clearly that the statutory standards are met
regardless of the type of any individual procurement." 2
At present, about 5oooo wage determinations are made yearly by the Wage-
Determinations Division of the Office of the Solicitor."8  Moreover, under the
Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, only single wage rates for given industries are
generally the subject of wage determinations. Under the Davis-Bacon Act separate
wage rates are determined in all cases for each classification of laborers and mechanics.
The Department's general form for requesting wage determinations, 4 for most
covered construction contains space for at least fifty-four separate classifications and
wage rates, while that for Interstate Highway1 5 construction contains space for at
least sixty-two classifications and wage rates.
The wage determination procedure is initiated by the procurement agency which
submits its request for a finding of wage-rates prevailing in the locality of the pro-
posed project for the various classes of laborers and mechanics whose employment
will be required. The request is usually made at least thirty days before any advertise-
ment of specifications or the beginning of negotiations, as the case may be.
The finding of the wage rates prevailing in the locality of the proposed project for
.0 Sec. 6, 49 Stat. 2038 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 40 (1958). See 41 C.F.R. Part 50-203 (Rev. 1963).
10See 41 C.F.R. § 50-202.2 (Rev. 1963); 28 Fed. Reg. 7513 (1964), 28 Fed. Reg. 1265 (1964).
110 Formerly § II, 49 Stat. 2039 (0936), renumbered, § 30, 66 Stat. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C. § 45
(1958).
l1 29 C.F.R. § 5.3, 29 Fed. Reg. IOO (1964).
.. Ibid. Formerly such similar wage determinations were issued under regulatory variances, and
were often referred to as "54 A-type" decisions. E.g., 32 C.F.R. § 1012.4040-2(a) (Rev. 1963).
... Hearings, supra note 41, at 64. The Office of the Solicitor performs the wage determination
functions of the Secretary of Labor under the Davis-Bacon Act and its related statutes. Id. at 63.
" Form DB-iz, Hearings, supra note 4r, at 83.
... Form DB-iz(a), id. at 84.
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the various classes of laborers and mechanics that will be required is an investigative
or appraising process." 6 The Department must have or obtain relevant wage rate
information in order to make its finding. To this end, the Department conducts a con-
tinuing program for the obtaining and compiling of such information. The Depart-
ment encourages the voluntary submission of such information by contractors, trade
associations, labor organizations, public officers, and other interested persons.117
The Department also subscribes to a commercial reporting service which keeps it
advised on a daily basis on new construction projects in almost every state."' The
names and addresses of the general contractors and their subcontractors are furnished
to us by the reporting service. We send letters to the contractors asking them to
furnish pertinent wage rate information.
Sometimes, the information which we have is insufficient for making a finding.
In such situations, a field survey can be made in the area of the proposed project for
the purpose of obtaining the necessary information." 9 In the course of such a
survey, local labor organizations, contractors, contractors' groups, and public
agencies are contacted. Upon occasion, hearings may also be held in order to
amplify further the record upon which the finding is to be based.
2 0
When the finding is made, and the wage determination is issued to the requesting
agency, copies of the wage determination are promptly sent to labor organizations
and contractor associations with the understanding that such copies will be distributed
to any local affiliates that may have an interest in the wage determination. This is
done in order to afford interested persons an opportunity to present timely requests
for changes in the wage determination upon the basis of any evidence that they
may have.' 21 In this connection, interested persons have access to the information
upon which the wage determination is based, although respect is given to any under-
lying data submitted in confidence in order not to discourage the voluntary sub-
mission of such data. The entire program depends in large measure upon the
voluntary submission of such data.
The act confers no litigable rights on bidders for government construction con-
tracts to challenge judicially the wage determinations of the Secretary of Labor. 22
However, the successful bidder (i.e., the contractor) has several avenues of review
with respect to the matter of labor costs. 23
Interested persons may, however, appeal to the Department's Wage Appeals Board
for review in its discretion of wage determinations by the Office of the Solicitor.12 4
11. Gillioz v. Webb, 99 F.2d 585 (sth Cir. 1938).
1172 9 C.F.R. 5 1.3, 29 Fed. Reg. 96 (x964).
11. Hearings, supra note 4, at 67.
110 29 C.F.R. § 1.7, 29 Fed. Reg. 96 (1964).
120 29 C.F.R. § x.8, 29 Fed. Reg. 96 (1964).
121 Hearings, supra note 4, at 70.
122 United States v. Binghamton Construction Co., 347 U.S. 171 (954).
... For a discussion of these, see Speck, Liability of the United States Upon Wage Schedules in Con-
struction Contracts, 23 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 249 (1955).
121 '9 C.F.R. § i.14; 29 Fed. Reg. 97 (I964).
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The Wage Appeals Board is empowered to pass upon all questions of fact and law.126
In the predetermination of wage rates under the Davis-Bacon Act, it is not
always possible for the procurement agency and the Department of Labor to foresee
in all cases what classes of laborers and mechanics will be needed in the course of
construction, and there is some question as to whether the act permits the determina-
tion of prevailing wage rates after the award of contract for classes of laborers
or mechanics not listed in the contract wage schedule. It is permissible, however, to
provide by contract that any class of laborers and mechanics not listed in contract
wage schedule shall be classified or reclassified conformably with that schedule, and
in the event the interested parties cannot agree on the proper classification or reclassifi-
cation of a particular class of laborers or mechanics, to refer the matter to the
Secretary of Labor for final determination. 126 The Department's regulations provide
for such a procedure' 27
2. Application of statutory terms.
Under section one of the Davis-Bacon Act.2 the Secretary of Labor predetermines
the minimum wages to be paid various classes of laborers and mechanics to be
employed under contracts covered thereby which are "based upon the wages . . .
determined . . . to be prevailing for the corresponding classes of laborers and
mechanics employed on projects of a character similar to the contract work in the
city, town, village, or other civil subdivision of the State . . . in which the work is
to be performed."
(a) Wages. There is no definition of the term "wages" in the act, nor in the
Department's rules. However, the term has been interpreted as meaning cash or its
equivalent. Unconditional vacation payments in cash are considered "wages" under
the act.'29
There is a need for a change in the act permitting the general inclusion of fringe
benefits in prevailing wage determinations. It is necessary in order to safeguard
substantial local practices under which such benefits are paid from outside practices
under which such benefits are not paid. This need has been generally recognized,
and requires no elaboration here.' 30
The term "wages" when used in connection with the making of wage determina-
tions means, to the extent practicable, current wages. Wages paid more than a year
previous to the request for the wage determination need not be considered.13 1
(b) Prevailing wage rate. The Department's rules concerning the making of
... Secretary of Labor's Order No. 32-63, 29 Fed. Reg. i18 (z964).
126 i9 DEcs. Comp. Gr;. 568 (r939).
7' 29 C.F.R. § 5 .5 (a)()(ii); 29 Fed. Reg. ioi (1964).
128 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), as amended, 49 Stat. ior (1935) , 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1958).
.2. Statement of Secretary of Labor Goldberg, in Hearings Be/ore the Special Subcomm. on Labor ol
the House Comm. on Education and Labor, on H.R. 9656 and H.R. 9657, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1962).
120 Report of House Committee on Education and Labor, H.R. REP. No. 308, 88th Cong., ist Sess.
2 (1963). A bill to include fringe benefits in wage determinations under the act was recently passed
by the House of Representatives. 11o CONG. REc. 1171 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1964).
lai 29 C.F.R. § 1.6; 29 Fed. Reg. 96 (1964).
DAVIS-BACON AND WALsH-HALEY AcTs 507
wage determinations do not define the term "prevailing" as such. Rather, they use
the term "prevailing wage rate," which is defined as follows for each classification
of laborers and mechanics in the particular area involved :132
(i) The rate of wages paid in the area in which the work is to be performed, to the
majority of those employed in that classification in construction in the area similar to the
proposed undertaking;
(2) In the event that there is not a majority paid at the same rate, then the rate paid to the
greater number: Provided, such greater number constitutes 30 per cent of those employed:
or
(3) In the event that less than 30 per cent of those so employed receive the same rate, then
the average rate.
The bulk of the criticism the Department's use of the term centers upon the so-
called "thirty per cent" rule, which is employed when there is no majority of
laborers or mechanics employed in a classification and before any resort is made to
finding an average wage rate as the "prevailing wage rate."' 3  In commenting
upon this rule in its report concerning the recent investigation of the administration
of the Davis-Bacon Act, the House General Subcommittee on Labor considered
it preferable to the use of an average." 4 The conclusion of the committee apparently
takes into consideration the fact that the percentage of workmen involved in an
application of the rule may range from thirty per cent to forty-nine per cent. Fur-
ther, such legislative history as there is on the point indicates that by "prevailing"
Congress meant the most predominant wage.' The use of an average discloses
a representative but not a predominant wage.
A number of states have similarly construed the term "prevailing" under analogous
legislation. The Hawaii and Kentucky statutes define the term to mean the rate
paid to a majority receiving a single rate, then the rate paid to the greater number,
provided this greater number constitutes at least thirty per cent. The New York
statute also has a similar provision. It looks first to the rate paid to the majority
of workers. However, if such a rate does not exist, the prevailing rate is considered
that which is paid to the greater number, provided that this greater number consti-
tutes at least forty per cent of the workers. If forty per cent does not receive a single
rate, then the average rate is controlling. The Wisconsin statute also defines this
term. Under its provisions, the prevailing wage rate is the rate paid to the majority,
and if there is no majority, then the rate paid to the greater number without
further limitation' 3
(c) Classes and corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics. The Secretary
of Labor predetermines the minimum wages to be paid various "classes" of laborers
and mechanics to be employed under a proposed contract from the wages found to
lag29 C.F.R. § z.2(a); 29 Fed. Reg. 96 (1964).
"'E.g., see Hearings, sup a .ore 41, at 16, 190, 239, 248, 737-
," Report of House Geneial Subcommittee, infra note 152, at 7, 8.
"' E.g., Hearings Belore the iouse Committee on Labor on H.R. J2, 122, 7005, 7254, and H.J. Res.
38, 72d Cong., ist Sess. 103, 189) (r932).
"'"Hearings, supra no'e 41, at 825.
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be locally prevailing "for the corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics" em-
ployed on projects of a character similar to the contract work. In so doing, the
Secretary generally takes the local corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics
as he finds them, although he may not use criteria which detract from the term
"classes," as used in the act. If the local practice is to distinguish crafts upon the
basis of end products, tools, and the like, it would seem that the statute does not
permit the Secretary of Labor to disregard such methods of distinction."1 To do
otherwise would destroy craft lines which the statute seeks to preserve. In distinguish-
ing craft lines for the purposes of wage determination, the Secretary uses the test of
locally prevailing practice. A different test is clearly unreasonable for wage
determination purposes, because it would permit the possibility of more than one
applicable minimum wage rate for the same work. Serious enforcement problems
would arise if anything but a prevailing practice test were used. For example, if a
"substantial" practice test were used as an alternative, the contractor would have a
choice of minimum wages to pay in any situation where the "substantial" practice
was not the "prevailing" practice.188 Moreover, it would not lend the certainty to
minimum labor costs prior to contract award which was sought by the 1935
amendments. 89
The terms considered under this heading were not included in the original Davis-
Bacon Act of March 3, 1931,"' which simply provided that "the rate of wage for all
laborers and mechanics employed by the contractor or any subcontractor ... shall be
not less than the prevailing rate of wages for work of a similar nature. . . ." The
investigation of the Walsh Committee, which contributed to the enactment of the
act in its present form, disclosed that under the original act, there had been a failure
to retain strict lines of demarcation between skilled and unskilled labor. As a
consequence, the tendency had been for wages of the skilled group to descend
toward the level of the unskilled group. As a result, the "work of a similar nature"
standard was deleted, and in lieu thereof provision was made for wage determinations
for "classes" of laborers and mechanics from the locally prevailing wages paid
"corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics employed on projects of a char-
acter similar to the contract work.''
(d) Projects of a character similar to the contract work. As indicated in the
preceding paragraph, the phrase "projects of a character similar to the contract
work" was not included in the original Davis-Bacon Act, but was added in 1935 as
part of a new standard replacing the original "work of a similar nature" standard.
The legislative history suggests that the phrase was intended to assure that workmen,
such as carpenters, plumbers, and electricians, receive wages while working on
" Cf. Comptroller General's letter B-x 4 7 6o2, Jan. 23, x963.138 Ibid.
... See Gillioz v. Webb, supra note ix6.
1' Sees. 1-2, 46 Stat. 1494 (x93). (Emphasis added.)
"'
1 Report of Senate Committee on Education and Labor, S. REP. No. 332, 74th Cong., xst Sesq. 17
(x935). (Emphasis added.)
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government projects which at least equal those they would receive when employed on
similar projects being constructed in the locality.' 42 Thus, in comparing the term
"contract work" with "project," the Department does not narrowly construe "con-
tract work" so as to refer only to the specified work in the contract, because this would
defeat the purpose of the phrase in situations where such work is only a part of a
larger planned undertaking. By "contract work" is meant, therefore, the overall
planned undertaking or project without regard to the mechanics of procurement-
ie., whether the work is to be accomplished under one or several contracts. 48
Otherwise, the application of the act would be dependent upon the mechanics of
procurement; and we do not believe this was intended.
In most wage determinations, the question of similarity of projects poses no
problem. We have found that it has been the general practice in the construction
industry to distinguish between heavy and highway construction on the one hand,
and building construction on the other, with one schedule of wage rates for the
heavy and highway construction and another schedule for the building con-
struction.'" In some areas and under some circumstances, a distinction is made
between heavy and highway construction.
Occasionally, however, situations do arise when it is necessary to pass upon close
questions involving the similarity of projects because of the presence of wage differ-
entials which are based upon construction more narrowly classified than building,
heavy, or highway, or because of difficulty in classifying a project as requiring build-
ing, heavy, or highway construction. In such situations, the projects considered for
wage determination purposes should closely correspond to the proposed project.145
(e) City, town, village, or other civil subdivision of the state in which the work
is to be performed. The Department's rules governing the making of wage deter-
minations provide that if there has been no similar construction within the city,
14 For a discussion of the legislative history, see Hearings, supra note 41, at 825.
"' E.g., Re the Determination of Prevailing Wage Rates for Construction Work at Pantex Ordnance
Works, Carson County, Texas; Report of Hearing Examiner, August 23, 1951, United States Department
of Labor; Re Prevailing Wage Rates for the Construction of Roads and Streets, Railroads, Utilities, in-
cluding Underground Fuel Storage Tanks, Water Mains, Gas Lines and Sewer Lines; Grading; Paving
of Airstrips, Runways, and Taxiways at Bergstrom Air Force Base and San Marcos Air Force Bases, in the
Austin, Texas area. Report of Hearing Examiner, March 12, 1953; Re the Determination of Prevailing
Wage Rates for the Construction of Roads and Streets; Railroads; Utilities, Including Underground Fuel
Storage Tanks, Water Mains, Gas Lines, and Sewer Lines; Grading; Paving of Airstrips, Runways and
Taxiways; Ellington AFB, Houston ORC Armory, San Jacinto Depot and Harris Co. A.C.W., in Houston,
Texas area. Report of Hearing Examiner, January 27, 1953. Predetermination of wage rates to be paid
for construction of site facilities for Houston Manned Spacecraft Center, Report of Solicitor, March 26,
1962.
"' Hearings, supra note 41, at 840.
t E.g., the construction of runways, aprons, and taxiways, and at a municipal airport have been
considered "similar" to the same type of construction at an Air Force installation. Re: Determination
of Prevailing Wage Rates for Construction Work at Tye Air Force Base, Taylor County, Texas, with
Particular Reference to Taxiways, Runways, Operational Aprons, and Related Work, Report of Hearing
Examiner, August 6, 1953. The construction of one dam has been compared to that of another. Re:
Determination of Wage Rates to be Paid Laborers and Mechanics on Building and Heavy Construction At
Gavins Point Reservoir, in Knot and Cedar Counties, Nebraska, and Yankton County, South Dakota,
Report of Hearing Examiner, January 30, 1953. In the case of residential housing projects, it may not be
inappropriate to consider similar housing projects. Hearings, supra note 41, at 873.
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town, village, or other civil subdivision of the state wherein the proposed project is
located, then the wage rates paid on the nearest similar construction may be con-
sidered. 40 Such legislative history as there is4' fully supports the Department's
position that this so-called "locality" standard was not intended to be given a narrow,
technical meaning. Congress apparently recognized that the Secretary must consider
an area sufficiently large so that there will be sufficient projects "of a character
similar" on which to base the wage determination, but with the limitation that it be
small enough to reflect local wages and not the wages of a different area.
The findings of the House General Subcommittee on Labor following an investi-
gation of the administration of the Davis-Bacon Act support the Department's
interpretation of this provision. The report of the Committee notes that in gathering
wage data on a project similar to Boulder Dam, the Secretary might have to go to
all adjoining states. 4s Administrative experience has borne out this observation.
For example, about nine years ago, the Oahe Reservoir was being constructed in
Stanley and Hughes counties, South Dakota. The reservoir was to be located about
six miles northwest of Pierre, South Dakota, and was to be completed at an estimated
cost of $300 million. It was to be 9,300 feet long and 242 feet high. The embank-
ment was to contain some 78,0o0,000 cubic yards of earth, and i,o65,ooo cubic yards
of concrete were to be required for the spillway. The area was rural in character,
and thinly populated. The labor force for the project obviously had to be drawn
from the entire state and beyond. Since there were no projects of a character
similar in the civil subdivisions involved, it was necessary to go beyond in search
of such projects, although in the particular case it was not necessary to cross statelines. 49
CONCLUSION
In concluding, it may be well to summarize the points of similarity and difference
in the coverage and wage determination provisions of the Walsh-Healey Public
Contracts Act and the Davis-Bacon Act.
The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act applies to government contracts in excess
of $xo,ooo for the manufacturing or furnishing of materials and equipment. The
Davis-Bacon Act applies to government contracts in excess of $2,000 for the con-
struction, alteration, and/or repair of public buildings or public works of the United
States. Both statutes are liberally construed in affording minimum wage protection
in federal procurement.
Under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, the requirement for the in-
clusion of representations with respect to the payment of minimum wages applies
only to purchases or contracts relating to industries which have been the subject of
14829 C.F.R. § i.2(a), i.5(b) (Rev. 1963).
1'For further discussion of the legislative history, see Hearings, supra note 41, at 828.
148 Report of House General Subcommittee on Labor, infra note 152, at 4, 5.
149 Re: Predeterminations of wage rates to be paid laborers and mechanics on construction work at
Oahe Reservoir, near Pierre, South Dakota, in Stanley and Hughes Counties, South Dakota, Report of
Hearing Examiner.
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wage determinations by the Secretary of Labor. Because of the enormity of statistical
problems and compliance with the formalities requisite to proceedings subject to
sections seven and eight of the Administrative Procedure Act, comparatively few
wage determinations are made under the act which have application in particular
or similar industries. In contrast, the inclusion of wage determinations by the
Secretary of Labor under the Davis-Bacon Act is mandatory in the case of federal
construction contracts. About 50,000 wage determinations are issued each year.
Under the Walsh-Healey Act, in most instances only a single minimum rate is
prescribed as a result of a wage determination for an entire industry, while under
the Davis-Bacon Act separate minimum wages are prescribed for numerous classi-
fications of laborers and mechanics.
The wage determination provisions under the two statutes differ somewhat.
The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act calls for the determination of "prevailing
minimum wages," whereas the Davis-Bacon Act requires that "prevailing wages"
for various classifications of laborers and mechanics be found.
The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act contains essentially three distinct wage
determination standards. The Secretary may determine the prevailing minimum
wages for persons employed: (i) on "similar work," (2) in "particular or similar
industries," or (3) in "groups of industries currently operating in the locality" in
which the contract is to be performed. Most wage determinations under the act are
made for particular industries, and contain no regional differentials because of
the existence of industry-wide competition for government contracts. When industry-
wide competition exists, only a co-extensive wage determination will serve the pur-
poses of the legislation. If plants in Community A are paying substantially lower
wages than plants in Community B, and all plants compete for government contracts,
the recognition of Community A and Community B as separate localities under the
act would mean that the plants in Community A might underbid plants in Com-
munity B upon the basis of lower wages. Even if the "locality" limitation is read
as limiting the entire wage determination function, it is not necessary to attach a
narrow geographic connotation to it where to do so would frustrate the legislative
purpose.
Under the Davis-Bacon Act, the prescribed minimum wages for various classes of
laborers and mechanics are those found by the Secretary of Labor to be prevailing for
the corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics employed on projects of a
character similar to the contract work in the city, town, village, or other civil sub-
division of the state in which the work is to be performed. The wage determina-
tions under the act reflect the prevailing wages paid in a civil subdivision of the
state wherein the proposed construction project is located. The Secretary considers
evidence beyond the civil subdivision only when there is not sufficient evidence
therein of wages paid on projects of similar character.
Some critics of the Davis-Bacon Act and the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act
have asserted that the statutes have outlived their usefulness, and that, therefore,
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they should be repealed.Y5 The core of their contention is that this legislation
is no longer justifiable, because the Fair Labor Standards Act affords sufficicnt
minimum wage protection.
Without the Davis-Bacon Act and the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, it
would not be unrealistic to expect the price of labor to become once more an element
in the competition for government construction and supply contracts. This legisla-
tion still constitutes an important part of our national labor policy, and retains its
usefulness.' 5 ' The findings of the House General Subcommittee on Labor following
an investigation of the administration of the Davis-Bacon Act fully support this
conclusion. The Committee noted that the fundamental principle of the Davis-
Bacon Act is to avoid the depression of local wage conditions as the results of federal
construction programs. The Committee found that this principle is as valid today
as it was when the act was first enacted in i931,152
Such legislation is not a unique federal phenomenon. The Davis-Bacon prin-
ciple has been given broad recognition in state legislation relating to public works
construction. There are thirty-four states which have statutes more or less similar
to the Davis-Bacon Act, providing for the prescription of minimum wages payable
upon such construction.'5
The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act merely represents an extension of the
Davis-Bacon principle to supply contracts. It was so regarded by its proponents.Y
5 4
... Hearings, supra note 41, at 730, 737-38 (Statements of Robert T. Borth, Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States; Frank W. Cantrell of Little Rock, Ark., on behalf of State Manufacturers
Association; James L. Mcllvaine, President, Northern Virginia Builders Association; Albert H. Small,
Chairman, Labor Committee, The House Builders Association of Metropolitan Washington). See also
Chamber of Commerce pamphlets: DAvis-BAcoN-THE SHOTGUN LAW; 'WALSH-HEALEy AcTr-Tu HoRsE
AND Bu.GY LAw; and INprsTtos's HELPMATE: THE DAvis-BAcoN AND WmAsH-HEALEY ACrs.
"'
1 This conclusion is shared by others. For example, in the recent hearings held by the House Special
Subcommittee on Labor on the administration of the Davis-Bacon Act, Leon B. Kromer, Jr., Executive
Vice President, Mechanical Contractors Association, testified as follows:
"The basic purpose of the act is no less valid today than it was 31 years ago when first enacted. To
eliminate this act, would, on federal and federally assisted construction, place laborers and mechanics
in the jungle of fierce competition that is the industry. Labor would again become a barter item in the
bidding to get work. In many areas of this country, with excess manpower available, the end result
with respect to wages and earnings would be all too apparent.
"Employees, therefore, need its protection as much today as at any time since enactment. The
association that I represent is unequivocally opposed to repeal of the act."
In a similar statement, James E. Swan, Director of Labor Relations, National Electrical Contractors
Association, testified as follows:
"Contrary to certain opinions . the Davis-Bacon Act was not an 'emergency' measure temporarily
enacted because of the depression of the 1930's. The Davis-Bacon Act concept was first proposed in
1926 by a Congressman Robert Bacon, Republican, New York. Hearings were held on legislative
proposals in 1927, and recurred until 1931.... In fact, President Herbert Hoover had repeatedly recom-
mended Davis-Bacon legislation, and issued an Executive Order substantially similar to the act. Legal
problems as to suitable legislative language . ..appeared to be a primary factor in the delay of enact-
ment." Hearings, supra note 41, at 657, 671, 672.
" STAFF OF HousE GENERAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR, 88TH CONG., IST SEss., ADmIINIsTrATION OF
THE DAVIS-BAcoN AcT I (Comm. Print 1963).
... Alaska, Arizona, Calif., Colorado, Conn., Dela., Fla., Hawaii, Idaho, Ill., Ind., Kan., Kentucky,
Maine, Md., Mass., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., Ohio, Oregon, Pa., R.I., Tenn.,
Texas, Utah, Wash., W.Va., and Wis., H.R. REP. No. 308, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1963).
' Report of House Committee on the judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 2946, 7 4 th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1936).
See also, for example, the remarks of Congressmen Citron and Hancock, 80 CONG. Rae. 10004 (1962).
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One of its primary objectives is to prevent the payment of wages lower than the
prevailing minimum wages from being a competitive factor in the procurement of
government supply contracts," 5 and to have the government's immense purchasing
power sustain labor standards rather than lower them. 56
It should be recognized that federal minimum wage legislation, of which the
Davis-Bacon Act and the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts form a part, is integrally
related to other facets of our national policy.
15 7
Critics have alleged from time to time that the Davis-Bacon Act and the Walsh-
Healey Public Contracts contribute to inflation. 5 s The allegation was examined in
the recent investigation by the House Special Subcommittee on Labor on the admin-
istration of the Davis-Bacon Act. The report concerning this investigation con-
cluded:""
Appropriate administration of the act would preclude any inflationary effects. What is
required under the act is that the Secretary of Labor find the wages that are prevailing in
a community. If this is done properly, what is reflected by a prevailing wage will be
merely the actual wage paid in a community. This would have neither an inflationary nor
deflationary result.
Contentions of inflationary effect have also been examined in several wage
determination proceedings under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, and they
have failed to withstand close scrutiny. 6 ° In the proceeding for the Evaporated
Milk Industry, it was stated that the record furnished no justification for assuming
that price increases to the public would result from discharging the statutory mandate
by making applicable to all firms who sell to the government the prevailing mini-
mum wages already in effect in the industry as a whole' 61
The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act and the Davis-Bacon Act are still an
important part of our national labor policy. Without this legislation, it would not be
unrealistic to expect that the price of labor once more would become an element
in the competition for government contracts. Following a recent investigation of
the administration of the Davis-Bacon Act, the House General Subcommittee on
Labor found that the fundamental principle of the Davis-Bacon Act is as valid today
as when originally enacted; that is, that federal procurement should not be a means
for depressing local wage conditions. The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, which
is an extension of the Davis-Bacon principle, has similar current validity.
"'U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR 50TH ANN. REP. 233 (I962).
... Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 50x (1943).
'" Hearings Before Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on Taft-Hartley Revision, 83 d
Cong., ist Sess. 581-84 (1953) (colloquy between Senator Taft and Arthur J. Goldberg).
"' E.g., see Chamber of Commerce pamphlet "Inflation's Helpmate: The Davis-Bacon and Walsh-
Healey Acts."
1'" See supra note 152.
'"Final Labor Dep't Dec., 24 Fed. Reg. 1986 (1958) (evaporated milk industry): final Labor
Dep't Dec., 22 Fed. Reg. 1986 (i958) (scientific, industrial, and laboratory instruments industry); tenta-
tive Labor Dep't Dec., 24 Fed. Reg. 8741 (I959) (tires and related products industry).
101 Ibid.
